There is increasing empirical evidence that creative destruction, driven by experimentation and the adoption of new products and processes when investment is sunk, is a core mechanism of development. Obstacles to this process are likely to be obstacles to the progress in standards of living. Generically, underdeveloped and politicized institutions are a major impediment to a well-functioning creative destruction process, and result in sluggish creation, technological "sclerosis," and spurious reallocation. Those ills reflect the macroeconomic consequences of contracting failures in the presence of sunk investments. Recurrent crises are another major obstacle to creative destruction. The common inference that increased liquidations during crises result in increased restructuring is unwarranted. Indications are, to the contrary, that crises freeze the restructuring process and that this is associated with the tight financial-market conditions that follow. This productivity cost of recessions adds to the traditional costs of resource under-utilization.
Introduction
The world economy today is undergoing momentous reorganization in the face of the development and large-scale adoption of information technology. In the words of Alan Greenspan 1999: "The American economy, clearly more than most, is in the grip of what … Joseph Schumpeter … called 'creative destruction,' the continuous process by which emerging technologies push out the old. ... The remarkable … coming together of the technologies that make up what we label IT -information technologies -has begun to alter, fundamentally, the manner in which we do business and create economic value".
This wave of restructuring is only the latest manifestation of Schumpeterian creative destruction, the process by which the production structure weeds out unproductive segments; upgrades its technology, processes, and output mix; and adjusts to the evolving regulatory and global environment.
Ongoing restructuring is as relevant for the developing world as it is for economies at the leading edge of technology. In this paper, we draw on the significant advances over the past decade in theoretical and empirical research on creative destruction to formulate a number of propositions concerning the role and workings of this mechanism in the development process. Some of the ideas we put forward are firmly grounded in empirical evidence; others are not more than hypotheses consistent with a combination of theoretical considerations and scattered evidence, but which deserve systematic investigation in the future.
The rest of this paper is organized into three sections. In the first section, we review recent international evidence on gross job flows that supports the idea that creative destruction is a core mechanism of growth in market economies. Our discussion revolves around three basic facts. First, the large, ongoing, and persistent gross job creation and destruction flows exhibited by all market economies studied provides evidence of extensive ongoing restructuring activity. Second, this reallocation process shifts resources from low to high-productivity sites, and is found to account for a large share of the growth in productivity. This highlights the central role of creative destruction in productivity growth. Third, the very large majority of gross flows takes place within narrowly defined sectors of the economy. This implies that traditional analyses of restructuring that emphasize shifts across production sectors and associated relative price changes only capture a small component of this phenomenon. The bulk of what we observe calls for a different sort of analysis, which emphasizes theories of experimentation and technology adoption. Further exploration of the role played by those silent flows may call for a shift in the development paradigm from the idea of a "big push" to a myriad of "little nudges."
If creative destruction is a core mechanism of economic growth, obstacles to this process are likely to be obstacles to development. This is of particular relevance to many developing economies today, which have opened up their markets and must now face the challenge of not only catching up, but keeping up with world standards. The second section argues that institutional impediments are likely to constitute major obstacles to a well-functioning creative destruction process, and explores their consequences. Any notion of restructuring is built on the assumption that investment in capital and skills is partly irreversible, and specific with respect to technology or the other factors of production it combines with. Relationship specificity requires inter-temporal contracting, for which a proper institutional framework is critical. If we consider institutional failure as the root obstacle to growth in the developing world, it is likely to constitute a major impediment to creative destruction.
We explore the consequences of a lack of contracting ability in the financial and labor markets on the restructuring process. Generically, such problems result in depressed creation; technological sclerosis, in the form of inefficient survival of low-productivity units; a disruption of the strict productivity ranking based on which efficient entry and exit should take place; and privately inefficient separations. Such ills can be as much a result of underdeveloped institutions as one of politicized institutions in response to the distributional effects of restructuring. On the empirical front, we explore available evidence on job flows in LDCs and the many issues that arise in bringing the data to bear on the above questions. We conclude that, to reach any conclusive evidence, a much more structural empirical approach is required than what has been attempted so far.
The third section argues that recurrent crises in the developing world are likely to constitute a second major obstacle to creative destruction. This line of argument contradicts the commonly held view that observed sharp liquidations during crises result in increased restructuring. However, jobs that are destroyed during a recession mostly feed into formal unemployment or under-employment in the informal sector, and not directly into newly created jobs. We argue that this issue can only be examined dynamically, and depends crucially on the behavior of creation and destruction during the ensuing recovery. We extrapolate from empirical work on US gross flows the proposition that, on the contrary, crises freeze the restructuring process and that this phenomenon is due to the tight financial conditions following a crisis, which reduce the ability to finance the creation of new production units. Given the presumption that developing economies suffer from technological sclerosis, the result is a productivity cost of crises that adds to the traditional costs associated with under-utilized resources.
Creative Destruction and Economic Growth
In this section, we review recent evidence that supports the notion that the process of creative destruction is a major phenomenon at the core of economic growth in market economies -an idea that goes back to Joseph Schumpeter 1942, who considered it "the essential fact about capitalism" (p. 83).
Underlying any notion of restructuring is the assumption that choices of technology, output mix, modes of organization are embodied in capital and skills. This irreversibility of investment entails that adjusting the production structure requires that existing investments be scrapped and replaced by new ones. If, on the contrary, capital were perfectly malleable and skills fully generic, adjustment would be costless and instantaneous. At a conceptual level, it is the embodiment of technology combined with incessant opportunities to upgrade the production structure that place ongoing restructuring at the core of the growth process, irrespective of whether the economy is a technological leader or laggard.
Restructuring is closely related to factor reallocation. If investments need to be scrapped, it is because they are working with factors of production that must be freed up to combine with new forms of investment. In other words, restructuring generates a reallocation of factors in which technology is not embodied. This link has been exploited empirically to develop measures of reallocation that can be used as an index of restructuring. The most successful measures developed so far are based on labor reallocation, although there have been attempts to look at other factors (see, e.g., Ramey and Shapiro 1998) .
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The literature on gross job flows has constructed measures of aggregate gross job creation and destruction based on microeconomic data at the level of business units -i.e., plants or firms (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1998 for an excellent survey). Gross job creation over a given period is defined as employment gains summed over all business units that expand or start up during the period; gross destruction corresponds to employment losses summed over all units that contract or shut down. Although job flows constitute a useful indicator of restructuring, the link between the two is loose. It is quite possible that plant equipment and organization be entirely upgraded without a change in the number of jobs; conversely, it is possible that jobs may migrate from one location to another (e.g., for tax reasons) to perform exactly the same activity.
Many studies are now available that construct measures of job flows for different countries. Three features of the data have emerged that allow us to characterize the role of creative destruction in the growth process:
1. Gross job creation and destruction flows are large, ongoing, and persistent.
2. Most job flows take place within rather than between narrowly defined sectors of the economy.
3. Job reallocation from less-productive to more-productive business units plays a major role in industry-level productivity growth.
Starting with the first feature, table 1 summarizes the average annual job flows measured for different economies. Job flows are generally large, both in high-income countries and for the few observations we have of LDCs (Colombia, Chile and Morocco) and transition economies (Estonia). It is very common that an average of at least one in ten jobs turns over in a year. Creation and destruction flows are simultaneous and ongoing. In US manufacturing over the period 1973-88, for example, the lowest rate of job destruction in any year was 6.1 percent in the 1973 expansion; and the lowest rate of creation was 6.2 percent in the 1975 recession. 4 Moreover, the bulk of those flows are not a case of temporary layoffs -which would not correspond to true restructuring. Table 2 presents data for a number of countries on the high persistence rates of job creation and destruction over a one-year and a two-year period (i.e., the percentage of newly created jobs that remain filled over the period; or of newly destroyed jobs that do not reappear over the period). Overall, job flow data seem to indicate extensive ongoing restructuring activity.
The second feature of the data is that reallocation across traditionally defined sectors accounts for only a small component of job flows. To measure the amount of creation and destruction that take place simultaneously above the amount required to accommodate net employment changes, define excess job reallocation as the sum of job creation and destruction minus the absolute value of net employment change. Table 3 presents data for various economies on the fraction of excess reallocation accounted for by employment shifts between narrowly defined sectors. This fraction never exceeds one-fifth, and is typically well below. Source: Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) Source: Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) , table 3.6 Source: Davis and Haltiwanger (1998), table 3.5 disruption. In addition, there is evidence that a large component of job flows is due to experimentation in the face of uncertain market prospects, technologies, cost structures, or managerial ability (see, e.g., Jovanovic 1982) . This idea is supported by evidence from US manufacturing that younger plants exhibit higher excess reallocation rates, even after we control for a variety of plant characteristics (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1998, p. 18 and figure 4.2).
Traditional analyses of restructuring in the trade and development literature emphasize one dimension of the creative destruction process -namely major shifts between main sectors of the economy. Much less noticed is the multitude of creation and destruction decisions driven by highly decentralized idiosyncratic factors and experimentation, whose role is potentially equally important. Many conventional questions in development may come under a new light once we consider the role played by those underlying flows.
For example, Levinsohn (1999) and Melitz (1999) argue that a significant benefit of trade reform arises through this channel from factor reallocation toward more productive firms.
In a similar vein, Olley & Pakes (1996) find that deregulation in the U.S.
telecommunications industry increased productivity predominantly through factor reallocation toward more productive plants, rather than trough intra-plant productivity gains. Our coming discussion of the effect of crises on restructuring activity and its costs in terms of productivity constitutes another example.
The function of large within-sector job flows and their relation to productivity gains brings us to the third feature of the data. There is evidence that factor reallocation is a core mechanism in the growth of productivity. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krian (1998) conduct a careful study and survey of this question. Examining four-digit U.S. Other studies of US manufacturing based on somewhat different methodologies (see Baily, Hulten and Campbell 1992; Bartelsman and Dhrymes 1994) concur with the conclusion that reallocation accounts for a major component of within-industry productivity growth. It would be of great interest to know whether restructuring is as productive in LDCs as it is in the US, but relevant studies are few and give rise to methodological issues. Aw, Chen and Roberts 1997, focus on Taiwan; Liu and Tybout 1996 on Colombia. Both define the within-plant term of their productivity decomposition based on a plant's average share over the period rather than its initial share. 5 As discussed by Foster et al. 1998 , this tends to under-estimate the contribution of reallocation across continuing plants. Moreover, both studies conduct their decomposition over a horizon shorter than ten years: five years for Taiwan, and only one year for Colombia. This reduces the contribution of entry, which takes place dynamically through the above-mentioned learning and selection effects. The resulting contribution of reallocation to average productivity gains is 34 percent for Taiwan, and near zero for Colombia. 6 Given the methodological differences, it is difficult to know whether this implies that factor reallocation in those LDC countries is less productive than in the US.
The evidence of extensive, ongoing job flows that are pervasive throughout the economy and constitute a major mechanism of productivity growth points to the centrality of creative destruction in the growth process. Whether ongoing restructuring is, in fact, as productive in LDCs as it is in an advanced economy like the US is a major concern, but it does not diminish the potential importance of this process for growth. A corollary is that obstacles to creative destruction are likely to be obstacles to development, and should be of central concern to development theory and policy. Such potential obstacles are the focus of the rest of this paper.
Institutions and Restructuring
We have seen that the notion of restructuring presumes that investment is partly irreversible. When two factors of production enter into a production relationship, they develop a degree of specificity with respect to each other and to the choice of technology, in the sense that their value within this arrangement is greater than their value outside. In the presence of specificity, the institutional environment becomes critical. The reason is, very generally, that irreversibility in the decision to enter a production relationship with another factor creates ex-post quasi-rents that need to be protected through ex-ante contracting (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978) . If contracting is problematic, it is the institutional environment that determines the rules by which those quasi-rents are divided. Poor institutions, by definition, prevent one of the parties to a transaction from getting the value of what it put in. This disrupts the broad range of financing, employment and sale transactions that underlie a healthy creative destruction process.
We view institutional failure as the root obstacle to economic growth in the developing world. 7 This leads us to the presumption that poor institutions are likely to constitute a major disruption to creative destruction. To the extent that investment irreversibility takes on an entirely new dimension in the presence of contracting difficulties, it becomes of crucial import for the analysis of development.
In this section, we propose a simple model of the distortions that are likely to affect the restructuring process and examine related empirical evidence. Our treatment of institutions is purposefully very generic. Our purpose is not to comment about specific arrangements, but to identify a common thread shared by many examples of institutional failure -financial markets that lack transparency and investor protection, overly 6 Since sector weights are not provided by Aw et al. 1997 , the calculated average contribution gives equal weight to the TFP growth rates in their protective labor regulations, highly politicized and uncertain competitive regulations, etc.
-that is likely to affect creative destruction in a systematic fashion.
Theoretical Considerations
A basic model. We develop a basic model, based on Caballero and Hammour 1998a, which focuses on specificity in the financing and employment relationship and its implications for aggregate restructuring. For this purpose we introduce three factors of production: capital, entrepreneurs, and labor. The specificity of capital with respect to entrepreneurs affects financing transactions; and its specificity with respect to labor affects employment transactions. All three factors exist in infinitesimal units and have linear utility in the economy's unique consumption good, which we use as numéraire.
Contracting obstacles affect the possibility of economic cooperation. In order to capture their implications at a general level, we define for each factor two possible modes of production: Autarky and Joint Production (figure 1). Autarky for each of the three factors is characterized as follows: (i) Capital can be invested in the world financial markets at a fixed world interest rate r A > 0 ("A" stands for Autarky). (ii) Each entrepreneur i has an innate level of skill or "productivity" y i and starts with net worth a i ≥ 0. If he does not enter Joint Production, he simply invests his net worth at the world interest rate.
(iii) Labor can be employed in the informal sector at a wage w A given by the informalsector labor demand function:
where U stands for informal-sector employment. We assume all workers start with zero net worth. In order to analyze restructuring, we assume the economy starts with pre-existing production units as well as a supply of uncommitted factors of production. Events take place in three consecutive phases: destruction, creation, and production. In the destruction phase, the factors in all pre-existing units decide whether to continue to produce jointly, or to separate and join the uncommitted factors. In the creation phase, uncommitted 
Efficient equilibrium. We first derive the economy's efficient-equilibrium conditions, which would arise if agents had perfect contracting ability. We restrict ourselves to parameter configurations that result in an interior equilibrium (0 < E < 1). On the creation side, given that the supply of entrepreneurs with the highest productivity y max is unlimited and that the Autarky return on capital is r A , the Autarky wage must satisfy
(a "*" denotes efficient-equilibrium values). Any wage below this value would induce infinite Joint Production labor demand; and any wage below would induce zero demand.
Labor supply into Joint Production is determined by (1)- (2):
The labor demand and supply system (3)-(4) determines the equilibrium creation of Joint Production units, as illustrated in figure 2 . Note that the Joint Production rewards for capital and labor are equal to their Autarky rewards, and that the reward for entrepreneurs is zero because of their unlimited supply.
Figure 2: Efficient and Incomplete-Contracts Equilibria
On the destruction side, scrapping the capital invested in a pre-existing unit free up a unit of labor. Efficient exit will therefore affect all units with productivity levels
Incomplete-contracts equilibrium. Because of investment specificity, implementing the efficient equilibrium requires a contract that guarantees capital in Joint Production its exante opportunity cost r A . The contracting incompleteness we introduce is due to the inalienability of human capital, which renders unenforceable any contracting clause that
removes the right of the entrepreneur or the worker to walk away from the relationship ex post (see Hart and Moore 1994) . This affects both the employment transaction between labor and capital, and the financing transaction between the entrepreneur and external financiers.
Starting with the employment relationship, we assume that the worker deals with the entrepreneur and his financier as a single entity. 8 If production unit i has productivity y i , its associated specific quasi-rent s i is the difference between the unit's output and its factors' ex-post opportunity costs:
Following the Nash bargaining solution for sharing the unit's output, we assume each part gets its ex-post opportunity cost plus a share of the surplus s. If β ∈ (0,1) denotes labor's share: Turning to the financing relationship, the profits π i are shared between the entrepreneur and external financiers. Again, because of the inalienability of human capital, the entrepreneur can threaten to leave the relationship and capture a share α ∈ (0,1) of π i (the outside options of the entrepreneur and the financier are both worthless). The firm's outside liability can therefore never exceed
This financial constraint places a lower bound on the net worth a i = 1 -b i the entrepreneur needs to start a project:
We assume α is large enough that (9) requires positive net worth when y i = y max . This implies that only entrepreneurs with positive net worth can enter Joint Production, in which case we have assumed that they have enough funds to fully finance a production unit.
We now solve for the incomplete-contracts equilibrium conditions. Starting with creation, an entrepreneur who is able to finance a production unit will find it profitable to do so if
which, given (6) and (7), is equivalent to
Because of the rent component in wages, capital behaves as if it faced a world interest rate higher than r A . The Joint Production demand for labor is given by the mass of entrepreneurs whose productivity satisfies (11) and can finance a production unit:
The supply of labor is given by the same equation (4) as in the efficient economy.
Together, those two equations determine the incomplete-contracts equilibrium level of L.
As illustrated in figure 2, labor demand (12) under incomplete contracts falls below its efficient-economy counterpart (3). This occurs both because of labor-market rents (which shifts the curve down vertically) and because of the financial constraint (which rotates the curve down around its vertical-axis intercept). In the incomplete-contracts equilibrium, Joint Production employment and Autarky wages are lower than their efficientequilibrium counterparts:
Turning to destruction, note that a worker who leaves a pre-existing production unit will find employment in Joint Production with probability L, in which case we denote his expected wage by E[w]; and will remain in Autarky with probability (1 -L), in which case his wage will be w A . The exit condition is therefore
Characterization of equilibrium. We now characterize the general-equilibrium consequences of incomplete contracting. The imbalances we describe constitute a highly inefficient macroeconomic solution to the unresolved microeconomic contracting problems. We first discuss features of equilibrium that are highly suggestive of the experience of developing countries, but pertain only indirectly to restructuring; we then turn to the direct implications for the restructuring process.
1. Reduced cooperation. At the purely microeconomic level, it is well known that limited contracting ability hampers cooperation. We have seen that positive-value Joint Production projects may not be undertaken because labor (eqn. 7) or the entrepreneur (eqn. 8) can capture rents beyond their ex-ante opportunity costs.
2. Under-employment. As we have seen in the discussion of equation (13), Joint
Production is characterized by under-employment (L < L * ), which is an equilibrium consequence of obstacles to cooperation in the financial and labor markets. In partial 9 In order to avoid issues related to the possibility that the entrepreneur may want to restart in a new production unit, we assume entrepreneurs in pre-existing units have zero net worth.
equilibrium, rent appropriation reduces the Joint Production return on capital. In order to restore this return to the level r A required by world markets, fewer Joint Production units are created, informal-sector employment balloons, and the opportunity-cost component w A of wages falls (eqn. 7). Generally, the extent of under-employment depends on the supply elasticity of the factor that suffers from specificity, which we assume here to be infinite.
The counterpart of under-employment in Joint Production is an overcrowded informal sector (U > U * ). The reason this happens is that we have assumed no need for contracting in Autarky. We view the informal sector as one where transactional problems are less severe because there is less need for cooperation with capital (due to low capital intensity or constant returns), because employment regulations can be evaded, etc. We now turn to the characteristics of equilibrium that pertain directly to restructuring.
The first three properties characterize the amount of equilibrium creation and destruction of Joint Production units; the last two characterize the quality of restructuring, understood as the net gain that results from it.
4. Depressed creation. Since creation in this economy is equal to L < L * , it follows that the equilibrium rate of creation is depressed compared to the efficient economy.
5. Sclerosis. The Joint Production structure suffers from sclerosis, in the sense that some production units survive that would be scrapped in an efficient economy. To see this,
compare the efficient and incomplete-contracts exit conditions, (5) and (14). Since w A < w A* was shown in (13) for Autarky and w i ≤ w A* in (15) for Joint Production, it is clear that cost pressures to scrap are lower in the incomplete-contracts than in the efficient equilibrium. Sclerosis is thus a result of the under-utilization and low productivity of labor. Sluggish creation and sclerosis can impose a heavy drag on aggregate productivity.
6. Unbalanced restructuring. Destruction is excessively high compared to the depressed rate of creation. To see this, note that the private opportunity cost used in (14) for exit decisions is higher than the social shadow wage w A of labor. This is due to the possibility of capturing a rent component in wages, which distort upwards the private opportunity cost of labor. It may appear paradoxical that the economy exhibits both sclerosis and excessive destruction. In fact, the former is a comparison with the efficient equilibrium and the latter is a comparison between private and social values within the incomplete-contracts equilibrium. The unbalanced nature of gross flows is closely related to the presence of rents and market segmentation. In Caballero and
Hammour 1996a, we argue that it sheds light on the nature of employment crises in developing countries.
7.
Scrambling. In the efficient economy, only the most productive entrepreneurs with y = y max are involved in Joint Production. Had their number been insufficient, others would have been brought in according to a strict productivity ranking. On the creation side, an efficient process should result in the highest-productivity projects being
implemented. This ranking is scrambled in the incomplete-contracts equilibrium, as another characteristic of the entrepreneur -net worth -comes into play. This tends to reduce the quality of the churn, in the sense that the same volume of scrapping and reinvestment will result in a smaller productivity gain.
Privately inefficient separations.
A dimension that we have actually not incorporated in our model, but which can also constitute an important consequence of contracting difficulties, is the possibility of privately inefficient separations. This can come about through factors similar to those that make creation privately inefficient, in the sense that agents are constrained from starting positively valued projects. For example, assume that a production unit goes through a period of temporarily negative cash flow that must be financed if the unit is to remain in operation. Such continuation investment would help preserve the unit's specific capital, and is therefore itself specific and subject to a financial constraint. When the financial constraint is binding, destruction can be privately inefficient and result in losses for the owners of both labor and capital. 12 This gives rise to another factor that reduces the quality of restructuring, as it generates spurious churn with little payoff in terms of productivity gains. Moreover, once we admit the possibility of private inefficiency on the destruction margin, then factors other than productivity may affect those decisions and also scramble the productivity ranking in exit decisions.
Political economy. The final theoretical issue we touch on in this section concerns some of the underlying causes for the institutional obstacles to efficient restructuring. We have taken the under-development of institutions as exogenous. However, it is important to recall that institutional arrangements have redistributive consequences that will not leave political actors indifferent, especially when facing the differential welfare impact of restructuring itself.
Institutions play two distinct functions: efficiency and redistribution. On one hand, it is naïve to think that markets can generally function properly without an adequate institutional framework. In their efficiency role, we have seen that the basic principle that determines institutions is that each factor ought to get out the social value of what they put in -i.e., absent any externalities, their ex-ante terms of trade. On the other hand, it is equally naïve to think that such institutions, being partly determined in the political arena,
will not also be used as an instrument in the politics of redistribution. A poor institutional framework is the result of a combination of under-development in the realm of contracting and regulations and of overly powerful political interest groups who have tilted the institutional balance excessively in their favor.
By displacing technologies and skills, creative destruction threatens a variety of incumbent interests, and can therefore itself give rise to political opposition and endogenous institutional barriers. Mere uncertainty concerning the impact of restructuring can, in fact, prop up opposition (Fernandez and Rodrick 1991) . Mokyr 1992 discusses many historical examples of resistance to technology adoption, perhaps the most popular of which is the nineteenth century Luddite movement in Britain (Thomis 1972) . 13 The response can range from mere neglect of the urgency of institutional reform to active barriers affecting trade, competition, regulation, the size of the government sector, as wells as the financial and labor market dimensions that we focused on in our model. 13 Political economy considerations have not failed to arise in the current debate on the impact of the IT revolution: "a major consequence of rapid economic and technological change … needs to be addressed: growing worker insecurity -the result, I suspect, of fear of potential job skill obsolescence. Despite the tightest labor markets in a generation, more workers report in a prominent survey that they are fearful of losing their jobs than similar surveys found in 1991 at the bottom of the last recession. … Not unexpectedly, greater worker insecurities are creating political pressures to reduce the fierce global competition that has emerged in the wake of our 1990s technology boom." (Greenspan 1999) As we have seen, a major pitfall of such protection, if intended to protect labor or other factors characterized by relatively inelastic supply, is that it can backfire and result in large-scale under-employment and internal segmentation between those who end up benefiting from protection and those who do not. This pitfall is worth highlighting as a number of Latin American economies (Chile, Argentina) go through the process of revising their labor codes in the context of ever increasing globalization and expanding outside options for capital (see Caballero and Hammour 1998b) .
A Look at Available Evidence
Theoretically, we have argued that poor institutions generally result in a stagnant and unproductive creative destruction process. If one considers institutional failure as the fundamental illness of the developing world, then one would presume that sclerosis and a low-quality churn are a prevalent phenomenon.
Although this is consistent with low productivity in LDCs, one would like to find more direct evidence from job flows on this issue. The data that were presented in table 1 do not seem to support our presumption. Job flows in the few developing countries we have data on are of similar, if not larger, magnitude as in high-income countries (see Tybout 1998). However, there are several powerful reasons why this evidence cannot be taken at face value:
1. Measurement issues. First, it is important to keep in mind the lack of uniformity in job flow measures, which may undermine their comparability across countries. Table 1 highlights two major differences: sample coverage (manufacturing, private sector, all employees) and the basic employer unit (the plant or the firm). Other Another useful natural experiment can be found in Eastern European transition.
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 1997 studied the case of Estonia, which was one of the most radical reformers. Estonia implemented major reforms in 1992. As reported in table 1, average annual job creation and destruction rates in Estonia over the period 1992-94 were 9.7 and 12.9 percent, respectively. Those figures are within the range observed in OECD economies. What is striking is that they coincided with a period of momentous reforms. For example, between 1989 and 1995, the share of private enterprises in total employment rose from 2 to 35 percent; and the share of establishments with more than 100 employees fell from 75 to 46 percent. In this context, observed job flows in Estonia are disappointingly low, which is not surprising given the major institutional deficiencies faced by transition economies.
4.
Productivity. So far, we have mostly discussed factors that affect the volume of the churn. Our theoretical discussion also pointed other factors -privately inefficient separations and the scrambling in the productivity ranking of entering and exiting units -which reduce the quality of those flows. In principle, the quality of the churn can be measured by an accounting exercise of the type discussed in the previous section, which accounts for the aggregate productivity improvements associated with job flows. In our discussion of the results for Colombia and Taiwan, we pointed out that methodological issues do not allow direct comparison with results for the US. As importantly, it should be pointed out that those studies do not account for the scrapping and re-investment costs of restructuring. When a firm exits and is replaced by a higher-productivity entrant, one should account for the cost of scrapping investments in the former and reinvesting in the latter. This is particularly important in comparisons between high and low-income economies, when employment in the latter is biased toward light industries and modes of production with low reinvestment costs.
In short, our conclusion is that cross-country comparisons based on raw job flow data are unlikely to provide conclusive evidence on the efficiency of restructuring. A more structural empirical approach is needed that addresses the type of issues discussed above.
From this point of view, the empirical literature is still in its infancy.
Crises, Recovery, and Productivity
Recurrent crises in developing economies have large welfare consequences. Some of these consequences are immediately apparent, while others manifest their damage over time and thus are often under-appreciated. A prominent example of the latter type, we argue, is the deep impact that crises have on the restructuring process. In this section we explore this connection. After clarifying a widespread misconception concerning the relation between liquidations and restructuring, we report evidence that leads us to conjecture that crises slow down the restructuring process. If this is so, and given our presumption of sclerosis in the production structure, crises are even more costly than their direct impact may suggest.
The liquidations associated with sharp contractions constitute their most noted impact on restructuring. 0% 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Net Creation Gross Creation Gross Destruction
Source: Roberts (1996) , table 2.2
Figure 3: Gross Manufacturing Job Flows in Chile (1979-86) Where analyses have been conducted, they have shown that a large fraction of destruction during contractions is permanent (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1992) . Efficiency dictates that the shakeout affect the least productive production units, and result in a "cleansing effect" (Caballero and Hammour 1994) . Naturally, a significant component of destruction may be privately inefficient, but even such spurious destruction is likely to be concentrated in lower-productivity units.
From the observation of sharp liquidations during crises, it has been inferred that crises accelerate the restructuring process. This view was highly influential among pre- figure 6 . 15 The bottom panel reports the cumulative impacts of a recessionary shock on creation and destruction. Surprisingly, recessions seem to reduce the amount of restructuring in the economy. This result of "chill" following recessions is significant and robust in several dimensions, including the introduction of a second, reallocation shock. Given the limitations of the data, our conclusion can only be tentative. But, if there is any evidence, it does not support prevailing views that recessions are the occasion for increased restructuring. 15 The regression underlying figure 6 uses manufacturing employment (N t ), the flow of gross job creation (H t ), and the flow of gross destruction (D t ) in deviation from their mean. Effectively, the scarcity of financial resources during the recovery limits the socially useful transfer of resources from low to high productivity units. 16 We do not have access to the data required to reproduce the above study for a developing economy. However, although the evidence of chill is derived from the US context, it is plausible that the same phenomenon also characterizes crises in developing economies. If there is any difference, the liquidity contractions in those economies are more marked, and their depressing effect on creation during the recovery is likely to be even stronger.
The example of Mexico's financial markets, and banks in particular, makes the point. The buildup in financial intermediation during the early 1990s ended during the "tequila" crisis. It was followed by a severe credit crunch that has yet to be fully worked out. Figure 7 highlights these broad patterns. The thick-solid line portrays the path of total bank credit as a fraction of GDP, while the thin-solid line represents credit to the nonfinancial private sector. Both the increase in the share of the latter in total loans, as well as the rise and abrupt turnaround of bank credit can be clearly seen. 16 Fluctuations in the pace of restructuring can be approached from a very different angle, by moving from job reallocation to the restructuring of corporate assets. Looking at merger and acquisition ("M&A") activity over time, and at its institutional underpinnings, we reach a conclusion that also amounts to a rejection of the liquidationist perspective (see Caballero and Hammour, 2000) . Essentially, a liquidationist perspective in this context would consider fire sales during sharp liquidity contractions as the occasion for intense restructuring of corporate assets. The evidence points, on the contrary, to briskly expansionary periods characterized by high stock-market valuations and abundant liquidity as the occasion for intense M&A activity. Again, financial factors and their institutional underpinnings seem to be at the core of this restructuring phenomenon. and needs. The story behind the tequila crisis episode is clear and well known: fears that the convertibility system would not survive led to a run on banks and on the monetary base. As a result, there was a massive credit crunch despite the astute use of the few degrees of freedom with monetary policy allowed by the convertibility law. 17 It is apparent from that episode that loans, especially to the private sector, took longer to recover than deposits. This slow recovery of loans was caused by the government's crowding out as it borrowed to pay back for its "monetary" intervention and, most importantly to our argument, by the sharp consolidation process experienced by the Argentine banking sector following the crisis. Source: BCRA Notes: In panel (b), the term "effective" refers to the fact that corresponding interest rates were subtracted from the growth rates. CD rates (30-59 days) were used as deposit rates. Credit-line rates were used as loan rates. It would probably be unwise to look for direct evidence of depressed reallocation along the lines we did for the U.S. The reason is that crises in developing economies often involve large changes in relative prices (e.g., the large real devaluation in Mexico) which naturally induce reallocation. The right metric is then one that controls for this purely neoclassical mechanism. Alternatively, it is quite possible that the chill may be responsible in part for the large real change in relative prices required to induce the much-needed sectoral reallocation during crises.
To sum up, it is quite likely that crises constitute another major obstacle to a wellfunctioning restructuring process, and that this disruption is closely associated with problems in financial markets. The result is a productivity-based social cost of economic crises that is incurred in addition to the traditional cost based on under-employment and the under-utilization of other resources. The cost of crises in terms of restructuring is twofold. First, crises are likely to result in a significant amount of privately inefficient liquidations, leading to large costs of job loss and liquidations of organizational capital.
Second, crises are likely to result in a freezing of the restructuring process and years of stagnation.
